Lots of noise, and occasional flashes of light, occasioned by that NYT forum. I've got a number of things I'd like to say in response to some of it all, but it's vexingly close to the start of the semester! But here's a quickie: I've seen a number of people talking about x-phi as though what x-phi is about is taking cases where we would traditionally have offered the armchair judgment that p, and replacing it with whatever the majority outcome is on a poll of the folk regarding p. We can quickly put aside the silliness there about the idea that we're offering some sort of majoritarian approach to philosophical methodology -- I'm pretty sure there's exactly zero actual x-phi papers that say anything like that -- there's a perhaps more interesting question as to whether at least some more sophisticated manner of replacing the armchair with intuition-surveys is intended. And it occurs to me that maybe no one has even something like that in mind, either. Basically, along the lines of the negative/positive x-phi divide, it seems that the negative folks are by and large kinda negative about using positive x-phi results as well; and the positive x-phi folks tend to be happy with a parallel-complementary-methods relationship with more traditional approaches. (I put myself squarely on the front side of that semicolon, of course.)
Am I right, then, that there is no actual experimental philosopher who endorses both a strong rejection of traditional armchair methods, and the idea that some sort of experimental methods can do the same sort of work that those traditional methods were meant to do? It's a view I'd argue against, but it's certainly not a crazy view, by any means -- does anyone hold it?
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